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Wolfe v. Commonwealth
576 S.E.2d 471 (Va. 2003)
L Facts
Justin Michael Wolfe ('Wolfe") dealt high-grade marijuana in Northern
Virginia. He purchased his marijuana from Daniel Robert Petrole ("Petrole"),
who was a well-known supplier in the area. In order to purchase marijuana from
Petrole, dealers gave him a down payment and paid off the balance when they
had recovered the cost in sales. As a result of this system, Wolfe often owed
Petrole tens of thousands of dollars. Early in 2001, Wolfe began plotting to rob
and murder Petrole. Wolfe enlisted another associate, Owen M. Barber IV
("Barber"), to carry out the actual crime. After much scheming and several
aborted attempts, Barber killed Petrole on March 15, 2001. Barber stood five
or six feet away from Petrole and shot him ten times. For his efforts, Wolfe
canceled two of Barber's debts, gave him a half-pound of high grade marijuana,
and promised to pay him 10,000 dollars in cash.'
Wolfe was charged with and convicted of several offenses which included
capital murder pursuant to Virginia Code Section 18.2-31(2).2 During the penalty
phase of the capital murder trial, the jury found both vileness and future danger-
ousness and sentenced Wolfe to death.3 The Supreme Court of Virginia consoli-
dated the automatic review of Wolfe's death sentence with his appeal of the
capital murder conviction and his appeal of the non-capital convictions.4
II. Holding
The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed Wolfe's conviction and death
sentence and did not find reversible error.' Nor did the court find any reason to
commute Wolfe's death sentence; therefore, it affirmed the judgment of the
circuit court.
6
1. Wolfe v. Commonwealth, 576 S.E.2d 471, 474-78 (Va. 2003).
2. Id. at 474 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(2) (Michie Supp. 2002) (classifying "[t]he
willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing" of another person by another for hire as capital
murder)).
3. Id. at 479.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 490.
6. Id.
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II. Anaysis7
A. Future Dangerousness
Wolfe claimed that there was insufficient evidence to establish future
dangerousness as an aggravator during the penalty phase.8 Virginia Code Section
19.2-264.2 requires that "a sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the
court or jury shall (1) after consideration of the past criminal record of
convictions of the defendant, find that there is a probability that the defendant
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious
threat to society."9 Wolfe's prior record included a conviction for simple possession
7. Wolfe asserted that the circuit court committed a panoply of errors in his case. The court
did not even entertain many of Wolfe's claims because they were not properly explained in his brief.
Id. at 479-80. The first error the court did consider was whether the circuit court should have
excused for cause two members of the venire. Id. at 480-81. These two members had been
exposed to basic media reports about the case, but indicated that they could still act as impartial
jurors. Id. at 480-82. The court stated that the circuit court was in the best position to gauge
prejudice during voir dire and should not be questioned unless there was manifest error. Id. at 482.
Wolfe raised two errors that occurred during the presentation of witness testimony, but he
did not object to either incident at trial; therefore, the court refused to consider the claims. Id.
Wolfe then argued that two witnesses who had been excluded from hearing each other's testimony
conferred with one another. Id. at 483. The court found that the defendant failed to establish that
this occurrence was intentional or that it caused him prejudice. Id.
The defendant asserted that the Commonwealth did not present enough evidence to prove
that the defendant hired Barber to kill Petrole, but the court did not find any merit in this claim.
Id.
Additionally, two witnesses for the prosecution were facing federal drug charges. Id. at 484.
Wolfe wanted an attorney to testify as an expert on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to explain
how cooperating with a United States Attorney could result in a lower sentence. Id. The circuit
court found this testimony to be speculative and would not admit it; the court agreed. Id.
Wolfe then argued that the Commonwealth's Attorney presented a misstatement of fact and
law to the jury. Id. at 487. The Commonwealth's misstatement of law occurred during the closing
argument; defense counsel did not object and the issue was procedurally barred. Id. at 488. During
sentencing, the principal from the school Wolfe had attended testified that he had brought razor
blades and syringes to school. Id. Months after the sentencing, defense counsel presented an
affidavit from the principal in which she recanted her testimony. Id. However, the circuit court
refused to consider the affidavit. Id. Because the affidavits was not part of the record, the court
would not consider any arguments based upon them. Id. Wolfe tried vaguely to assert that these
decisions violated his due process rights, but the court found no merit in this claim. Id. at 487.
Finally, Wolfe asserted that his death sentence was imposed under the influence of passion
and prejudice. Id. at 489. The court reviewed the record and did not find evidence of passion or
prejudice. Id. at 489-90. These claims will not be discussed further in this case note.
8. Wolfe, 576 S.E.2d at 484.
9. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie 2000)). But see VA. CODE ANN. 5 19.2-
264.4(C) (Michie 2000) (stating that "[the penalty of death shall not be imposed unless the
Commonwealth shall prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a probability based upon
evidence of the prior history of the defendant or of the circumstances surrounding the commission
of the offense of which he is accused that he would commit criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing serious threat to society"). Section 19.2-264.2 states that a sentence of death
based on future dangerousness cannot occur until "after consideration" of the defendant's past
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of marijuana, possession of false identification, and the underage purchase of
alcohol. ° The defendant argued that these convictions for non-violent crimes
were insufficient to prove that he would continue to commit criminal acts of
violence." The court did not respond to this precise point. Rather, the court
stated, "[c]ontrary to the defendant's assertion, it is not necessary that he have
a prior criminal record as a predicate on which the jury must rely before it can
sentence him to death based on future dangerousness."' 2 Not only does this
statement seem contrary to Section 19.2-264.2, but it ignores the fact that the
defendant did have prior convictions. The court then shifted away from the
troublesome language of the statute and focused on Wolfe's career as a dealer,
his affinity for planning robberies, and the manner in which he had the victim
killed. 3 The court concluded that these facts were enough to support a finding
of future dangerousness. In effect, the court relied solely on Section 19.2-
264.4(C) without citing to that statute.
14
B. Vikness
Wolfe also argued that the vileness aggravator could not be vicariously
attributed to the hirer because of the manner in which the hitman carried out the
crime.' The court chose not to decide this issue. 6 Because it upheld the finding
of future dangerousness, the vileness element was not necessary to justify Wolfe's
sentence of death and vicarious applicability of vileness remains an open
question. 7
criminal record. §19.2-264.2. Section 19.2-264.4(C) does not repeat this requirement. § 19.2-
264.4(C). However, the court held in Barnes v. Commonwealth that "the tests required by Code § 19.2-
264.2 are the sole criteria governing the application of the death penalty." Barnes v. Common-
wealth, 360 S.E.2d 196, 202 (Va. 1987).
10. Wof'ie, 576 S.E.2d at 484-85.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 485. The court has been consistent in its refusal to merge the language of §19.2-
264.2 with §1 9.2-264.4(C) and it cited four cases in which it concluded that prior criminal convic-
tions are not a predicate for a finding of future dangerousness. Id. (citing Kasi v. Commonwealth,
508 S.E.2d 57, 66 (Va. 1998) (concluding that prior criminal convictions are not a prerequisite for
a finding of future dangerousness); Goins v. Commonwealth, 470 S.E.2d 114, 130-131 (Va. 1996)
(supporting the same); Breard v. Commonwealth, 445 S.E.2d 670, 681 (Va. 1994) (supporting the
same); Murphy v. Commonwealth, 431 S.E.2d 48, 53 (Va. 1993) (supporting the same)). On
appeal, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in each of these cases. See Wo f, 576
S.E.2d at 485 (clarifying that the Supreme Court denied certiorari in all four mentioned cases).
13. Wofe, 576 S.E.2d at 485.
14. Id. at 485-86; see § 19.2-264.4(C) (explaining that the prior history of the defendant and
the nature in which the crime was committed can be used to prove future dangerousness to the
jury).
15. Wolfe, 576 S.E.2d at 485.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 485-86.
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C. Lfe Means life
During the sentencing deliberations, the jury asked the court about the
limits of life imprisonment: "Does life imprisonment mean that the defendant
will never be released from prison by any means?" 8 The circuit court already had
given the jury a proper instruction under Yarbrough v. Commonwealth." Wolfe
argued that the circuit court's response should have been that imprisonment for
life meant the rest of Wolfe's natural life.2" The circuit court explained that it
could not give such a response because there is a possibility of clemency or
geriatric release.21 Nevertheless, the circuit court did not want the jury to
consider either of these two possibilities because it could have led to unfair
speculation and a harsher penalty.22 Instead, the circuit court instructed the jury
that it must continue to deliberate under the initial instructions.' The court relied
on Bell v. Commonwealth24 to determine that the circuit court responded
appropriately because a more detailed response to these types of jury questions
would either have been inaccurate or would have led to unnecessary speculation. 5
D. Effect ofRing v. Arizona
Next, Wolfe challenged the sufficiency of his indictment because it did not
specify the aggravators.26 The United States Supreme Court held in Ring v.
Arkona27 that aggravators are elements of the offense.28 Virginia case law has
held that elements of the offense must be charged in the indictment.29 However,
18. Id. at 486 (emphasis in the original).
19. Id.;seeYarbroughv. Commonwealth, 519 S.E.2d 602,616 (Va. 1999) (holding that, upon
the defendant's request, the trial court must instruct the jury that life imprisonment means life
imprisonment without parole).
20. Wolfe, 576 S.E.2d at 486.
21. Id. Geriatric release would not, however, have been available to Wolfe. Geriatric release
is not available to defendants convicted of a class one felony and Wolfe had been convicted of
capital murder at the time of sentencing. See VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-40.01 (Michie 1999) (allowing
geriatric conditional release except for class one felony offenses).
22. Woe, 576 S.E.2d at 487.
23. Id.
24. 563 S.E.2d 695 (Va. 2002).
25. Wo fe, 576 S.E.2d at 487 (citing Bell v. Commonwealth, 563 S.E.2d 695, 718 (Va. 2002)
(concluding that the circuit court did not err when it instructed the jury to rely on the original
instructions in order to avoid inaccuracy and speculation)); see Kristen F. Grunewald, Case Note,
15 CAP. DEF.J. 231 (2002) (analyzing Bellv. Commonwealth, 563 S.E.2d 695 (Va. 2002)).
26. l fe, 576 S.E.2d at 488-89.
27. 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002).
28. See Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 2441 (2002) (explaining that a factor " 'used to
describe an increase beyond the maximum authorized statutory sentence . . . is the functional
equivalent of an element of a greater offense"' (quoting Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 U.S. 466,494
n.19 (2000))).
29. Hagood v. Commonwealth, 162 S.E. 10, 12 (Va. Ct. App. 1932) (stating that it "is of
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Wolfe did not raise this contention until several months after trial. The court
found this claim to be untimely.3"
E. Proportionality Review
Finally, Wolfe claimed that his sentence was excessive and
disproportionate.3" The court quoted Hedrick v. Commonwealth32 and stated that
the test for proportionality is whether "juries in this jurisdiction generally approve
the supreme penalty for comparable or similar crimes."33 In its application of
this standard, the court stated that "[w]e have examined the records of all capital
murder cases reviewed by this Court when, as here, the death penaly was based upon
murder for hire."34 When a defendant is found guilty of capital murder and is
sentenced to life in prison, and if he or she appeals, the appeal is heard by the
Virginia Court of Appeals. 5 Such cases are rarely reviewed by the Supreme
Court of Virginia.36 When a defendant is found guilty of capital murder and is
sentenced to death, his or her sentence is automatically reviewed by the Supreme
Court of Virginia.3" Because the Supreme Court of Virginia is a repository for
death sentences and only rarely reviews life sentences, its proportionality review
systematically ignores capital murder cases that result in a life sentence. Even if
the court has reviewed life sentence cases, it states in Wolfe that it compared his
case only with death sentence cases. Comparison of the instant case solely with
other death cases simply cannot reveal what juries generally do in cases similar to
the instant case.
course necessary for an indictment to set forth all of the essential elements of the crime, and, if any
of them are omitted, it is fatally defective").
30. Wolfe, 576 S.E.2d at 489. For a copy of the Motion to Dismiss Capital Murder Indict-
ments for Failure to Allege Aggravating Elements, please contact the Virginia Capital Case
Clearinghouse at (540) 458-8557.
31. Wolfe, 576 S.E.2d at 490; see VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-313(C)(2) (Michie 1999) (requiring
the Supreme Court of Virginia to consider and determine if a sentence of death is proportionate
to similar crimes and defendants).
32. 513 S.E.2d 634 (Va. 1999).
33. Wofe, 576 S.E.2d at 490 (quoting Hedrick v. Commonwealth, 513 S.E.2d 634, 642 (Va.
1999) (emphasis added)).
34. Id. (emphasis added).
35. See generally VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-406(A)(i) (Michie 1999) (giving jurisdiction to the
Virginia Court of Appeals to hear an appeal of any crime except those in which a sentence of death
has been handed down).
36. See Cynthia M. Bruce, Proportiona#ty Review: Sil/Inadequate, But StillNecessay, 14 CAP. DEF.
J. 265, 268 (2002) (explaining that very few appeals of life sentences arrive before the Supreme
Court of Virginia because defendants given a life sentence can receive no lower sentence; therefore,
they never appeal on sentencing issues).
37. See generally VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-406(B) (Michie 1999) (granting the Supreme Court
of Virginia jurisdiction over all appeals from a sentence of death).
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IV. Application in Virginia
The Supreme Court of Virginia is quite adamant that the future
dangerousness aggravator need not be triggered by a history of prior
convictions.38 Each time the court has reached this conclusion the United States
Supreme Court has denied certiorari. 9 In light of this fact, attorneys should
continue to argue that under Section 19.2-264.2 juries may not consider future
dangerousness in cases in which the defendant has no prior criminal
convictions.4' Attorneys should also continue to argue that vileness cannot be
attributed to a defendant charged with murder for hire based upon the manner
in which the crime was committed. Finally, attorneys should request that
proportionality review be conducted with prior cases heard by the Supreme
Court of Virginia and, at least, prior cases heard by the Virginia Court of Appeals.
Attorneys should contact the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse for a copy of
the Life Sentence Project which lists defendants who have been convicted of
capital murder, but were sentenced by a jury to life imprisonment.
Janice L. Kopec
38. See supra note 12 (noting four cases in which the Supreme Court of Virginia has stated
that prior convictions are not a prerequisite for a finding of future dangerousness).
39. Id.
40. For a copy of the Motion To Bar Commonwealth From Seeking A Death Sentence
Based on Future Dangerousness and a memorandum in support contact the Virginia Capital Case
Clearinghouse at (540) 458-8557.
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